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Abstract
This article describes important possible scenarios in which rapid 
advances in artificial intelligence (AI) pose multiple risks, including 
to democracy and for inter-state conflict. In parallel with other 
countries, New Zealand needs policies to monitor, anticipate and 
mitigate global catastrophic and existential risks from advanced new 
technologies. A dedicated policy capacity could translate emerging 
research and policy options into the New Zealand context. It could 
also identify how New Zealand could best contribute to global 
solutions. It is desirable that the potential benefits of AI are realised, 
while the risks are also mitigated to the greatest extent possible.
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Artificial intelligence (AI) is not one technology but many and includes machine learning applications and 
a number of types of advanced algorithms. 
The development and deployment of 
these technologies promises to advance 
economies, wellbeing and sustainability 
(AI Forum New Zealand, 2019). However, 
AI is both a general purpose technology, 
and a dual use technology of concern. This 
means that AI has a diverse set of uses both 
beneficial and harmful. This technology is 
now widely distributed in a world full of 
complex interacting threats. In the longer 
term, AI could plausibly even pose an 
existential threat to humanity. 
In a previous issue of Policy Quarterly 
we outlined the emerging risks posed by 
AI and presented broad options for a New 
Zealand policy response (Boyd and Wilson, 
2017). In the two years since that 
publication a lot has changed. Many of the 
developments are summarised in a major 
report by the Australian Council of Learned 
Academies (ACOLA), which notes that AI 
has global impact and that an international 
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response is needed (Walsh et al., 2019). 
Cédric O, the secretary of state for the 
digital sector of France, highlighted this 
shared international concern when he said, 
‘An international platform will be necessary 
in order to ensure a sustainable 
development of artificial intelligence and 
serve humanity as a whole’ (Marrs, 2019). 
In what follows we resurvey the 
emerging AI landscape from a New Zealand 
perspective, identify potential catastrophic 
risks from AI, and argue for policies and 
action to anticipate and mitigate these risks 
in order that AI might predominantly 
benefit New Zealand society.
Recent advances in AI and the policy 
response
Our previous article outlined four AI risk 
domains: bias and injustice; economic 
chaos and the transformation of work; 
AI dominance of media discourse; and 
security and existential risks. Public sector 
work (internationally and in New Zealand) 
has focused on addressing some of these 
issues over the last two years. 
For example, the risk of algorithmic 
injustice due to biased data, explicit or 
implicit algorithmic rules, and even 
unjustifiably neutral algorithms (Susskind, 
2018) has entered mainstream thought. 
The AI Forum of New Zealand’s report 
Towards Our Intelligent Future (AI Forum 
New Zealand, 2019) discusses these; an 
Algorithm Assessment Report (Statistics 
New Zealand, 2018) assesses government 
algorithm use; and there is a forthcoming 
Digital Government Strategy currently (as 
of late 2019) at consultation stage. Statistics 
New Zealand has also released a draft 
Algorithm Charter for consultation 
(Statistics New Zealand, 2019). Related 
work on the safe and appropriate use of 
data and the importance of transparency, 
explainable algorithms and the right to 
review are helpful early steps.
Employment prospects and economic 
stability in an automated world are the 
focus of work by the New Zealand 
Productivity Commission (Productivity 
Commission, 2019) and the Prime 
Minister’s Business Advisory Council 
(Business Advisory Council, 2019). There 
is a Future of Work Tripartite Forum, and 
also a New Zealand Digital Skills Forum. 
Ensuring growth in a world enabled by AI 
is being taken seriously and policy 
approaches are proposed. 
With respect to AI and media discourse, 
the threat that recommendation algorithms 
are serving up harmful content has reached 
global awareness through such initiatives 
as the New Zealand-initiated ‘Christchurch 
Call’ (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 
2019). 
The risks of physical harm, use of 
technology as a weapon, and risks of 
accidental technological catastrophe are 
probably growing. A number of 
international researchers see the catastrophic 
risks of AI as the most likely near-term 
threat to humanity (Turchin and 
Denkeberger, 2018b). This is especially so 
when use of AI might enhance the threats 
posed by nuclear weapons and advanced 
biotechnology. While many measures of 
human wellbeing, such as life expectancy, 
infant mortality, murder rates and tolerance, 
have all been trending for the better (Pinker, 
2011), the risk that we cause great harm to 
ourselves with advanced technology is 
probably growing (Bostrom, 2019). 
The AI discussion takes centre stage 
There has been an explosion of AI-related 
publications, including reports with a 
New Zealand focus. In addition to those 
mentioned above, the Royal Society of 
New Zealand’s report The Age of Artificial 
Intelligence in Aotearoa (Royal Society of 
New Zealand, 2019) accompanied the 
major report by ACOLA. 
Most national AI strategies focus on 
research, talent and industrial strategies 
(Dutton, 2018). Finland and the 
Netherlands have started to systematically 
educate their populace on AI (Delcker, 
2019; University of Amsterdam, 2019). The 
United States and China also have a 
substantial focus on developing AI (Future 
of Life Institute, 2019; Select Committee 
on Artificial Intelligence, 2019).
Although many of these publications 
mention well-known and near-term risks 
(such as job displacement, bias and 
injustice), other reports have an explicitly 
upbeat tone. Economic analyses by 
PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC, 2018) and 
McKinsey (McKinsey Global Institute, 
2018) trumpet the boon AI will bring to 
profit and productivity. 
Towards Our Intelligent Future is the 
most comprehensive report on AI in New 
Zealand to date. The AI Forum identifies 
risks due to the domination of AI technology 
by a handful of advanced corporations and 
the potential for an economy enabled by AI 
that results in wider inequality. Issues of 
algorithmic bias, injustice, transparency, 
fairness, autonomy, privacy, inclusiveness 
and safety are all touched on. So too are the 
risks of citizen manipulation, cyber-attack 
and totalitarian practices. Some of these 
risks may have an impact on only a small 
proportion of the population, but others 
could be the seeds of greater problems. The 
AI Forum provides a policy map, but in what 
follows we move beyond these day-to-day 
policy needs and focus on the larger-scale 
risks of AI. 
The growing AI risk 
AI could cause large-scale harm if it is 
programmed to do something devastating, 
or if it develops a destructive method 
to achieve its goals (Bostrom, 2014). 
Deployment of AI could also create 
structural risks that might lead to, or 
exacerbate, other threats (Zwetsloot and 
DaFoe, 2019). Structural threats will often 
require collective action to counter. 
The AI Forum identifies risks due to 
the domination of AI technology by a 
handful of advanced corporations and 
the potential for an economy enabled by 
AI that results in wider inequality. 
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Risks from AI have been outlined in a 
number of recent papers (Brundage et al., 
2018; The Workshop, 2019; Turchin and 
Denkeberger, 2018a; Yampolskiy and 
Spellchecker, 2016). The Malicious Uses of AI 
report catalogues these as threats to digital 
security, physical security and political 
security (Brundage et al., 2018). The 
probability and seriousness of catastrophic 
AI failures will likely increase with time 
(Yampolskiy and Spellchecker, 2016).
Recent technical developments 
underscore this growing risk. For example, 
Google DeepMind has made very rapid 
progress in mastering strategic games 
(AlphaStar Team, 2019). The significance 
of this is that DeepMind’s AI applications 
are now exhibiting strategic capability that 
was until recently considered an 
engineering challenge. DeepMind also 
developed AlphaFold to predict the three-
dimensional structure of biological 
proteins from their primary amino acid 
sequence. This is a very difficult problem 
in biology, and AlphaFold won the annual 
protein-folding prediction contest on its 
first attempt (Evans et al., 2018). 
Open AI has developed an application 
for generating text content, which was 
deemed ‘too dangerous to make public’ and 
so only a partial version as open source has 
been released (Radford et al., 2019; 
Whittaker, 2019). Deepfake technology can 
now produce realistic video content 
depicting events that never occurred with 
convincing resemblance to actual subjects. 
This technology is now easily accessible and 
widely deployed (Barnes and Barraclough, 
2019): for example, the video of Mark 
Zuckerberg describing how he was 
influenced by fictional villainous entity 
Spectre (O’Neill, 2019). Deepfake 
technology was also used to impersonate 
the voice of a CEO for economic gain 
(Stupp, 2019).
In sum, the ability of AI to produce 
synthetic text and multimedia, generate 
insights in domains such as biotechnology, 
and engage in strategic activity is rapidly 
progressing. 
Even this present AI technology gives 
reason to be concerned. Allan DaFoe of the 
Centre for the Governance of AI at the 
Future of Humanity Institute has argued 
that even if we stopped scientific 
improvement in AI now, there are extreme 
systemic risks, including: mass labour 
displacement, unemployment and 
inequality; of AI as a key strategic industry, 
with monopolistic frontrunners; that 
surveillance could empower suppressive 
regimes and robotic repression could 
circumvent any human reluctance to fire 
upon protestors; of AI undermining global 
strategic stability by allowing for a successful 
pre-emptive nuclear strike (for example, if 
satellite image analysis and ocean sensors 
could reliably reveal the location of the 
nuclear-capable submarines necessary for a 
retaliatory strike) (DaFoe, 2018).
Global catastrophic risks 
Global catastrophic risks are those which 
would bring crippling damage to human 
wellbeing on a global scale (Bostrom 
and Cirkovic, 2008). Such events may 
currently be of low probability, but they 
are potentially high impact and warrant 
attention because even a small decrease 
in the probability of their occurring has 
large pay-offs. Some of the risks from 
AI fall within this category. In addition, 
several scenarios show that AI could 
pose an existential threat to the survival 
of humanity or to the continuation of a 
flourishing technological civilisation. Such 
threats are identified in the work of Nick 
Bostrom (Bostrom, 2014), and have been 
catalogued (Turchin and Denkeberger, 
2018a). We now examine six persisting 
risks associated with AI for which there 
does not yet appear to be an adequate 
policy response. 
The risk that democratic processes erode 
Access to clean information and tracking 
actual states of affairs in the real world 
underpins all well-functioning democratic 
processes. AI is emerging as a threat to the 
functioning of democracy, which may 
result in a broken system that produces 
erratic, non-representative outcomes. In 
the wake of the Cambridge Analytica 
scandal, the concept of ‘weaponised 
advertising’ emerged, where big data helps 
to target individuals and sway opinions. 
Non-legitimate powers are using AI and 
campaigns of disinformation in strategic 
efforts to bypass the democratic process 
(Mazarr et al., 2019; Polyakova, 2018). 
The ACOLA report on AI in Australia and 
New Zealand notes that platforms have 
been hijacked and websites, social media 
accounts and links created and inserted 
in connection with the Brexit referendum 
and the 2016 United States presidential 
election (Walsh et al., 2019).
There is some evidence that it is difficult 
to convince people to change their minds. 
However, clouding the argument with 
misinformation can inhibit political 
discourse, thereby advancing strategic ends 
(Bridle, 2018). Synthetic text and deepfake 
media are likely to increase the cloudiness. 
Algorithmic content recommendations 
amplify these effects. Also, modelling studies 
demonstrate that these algorithms can 
prevent populations converging on agreed 
beliefs (Sirbu et al., 2019). In this increasingly 
chaotic information environment, it is 
almost impossible to distinguish actors, 
motives, fake news, paranoid fiction and 
state propaganda (Bridle, 2018). 
A New Zealand perspective on digital 
threats to democracy has been taken by one 
group, The Workshop, which has identified 
three core problems: platform monopolies, 
opaqueness of the algorithms, and business 
models that reward amplification of 
engagement without regard for wellbeing 
(The Workshop, 2019). The Perception 
Inception report on synthetic media 
(Barnes and Barraclough, 2019) examines 
these threats but recommends that no new 
law is needed in New Zealand at present. 
However, even if laws were to be changed, 
AI is emerging as a threat to the 
functioning of democracy, which may 
result in a broken system that produces 
erratic, non-representative outcomes. 
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this won’t prevent illegal activities. Better 
content moderation might be a step in the 
right direction, but the scale of the problem 
demands a wider and more effective 
response (The Workshop, 2019).
New Zealand society will need to decide 
to what degree we accept machines 
inferring psychological information about 
us in order to manipulate our beliefs (Burr 
and Cristianini, 2019), and whether 
content targeting interferes with the 
human right to free belief formation (UN 
Special Rapporteur, 2018). We may need 
to act to avoid a future political sphere 
where intelligent algorithmic code enables 
those with vested interests to exert power 
through ubiquitous surveillance and the 
control of perception (Susskind, 2018). 
The risk of totalitarianism
It is one thing for democracy to degrade and 
cease functioning as intended; it is another 
for surveillance and control systems 
to incrementally push a functioning 
democracy towards totalitarianism. 
The increasing business use of 
intelligent surveillance systems, such as 
facial recognition, coupled with state 
surveillance approaches, including the 
array of Chinese social credit scoring 
systems (Kobie, 2019), along with rogue 
apps harvesting massive caches of user 
data means there may be very little that 
remains private in the ‘age of surveillance 
capitalism’ (Zuboff, 2019). Especially 
concerning is the ability of AI systems to 
detect emotions, identified by the World 
Economic Forum as a tool by which 
‘oppressive governments could … exert 
control or whip up angry divisions’ 
(World Economic Forum, 2019, p.73). 
These trends will potentially change 
human behaviour on a mass scale. 
Privacy can be waived by an informed 
individual, but privacy has benefits for 
society beyond those of the individual. For 
example, when privacy is absent, dissenting 
thought is suppressed. This has implications 
for the ability of individuals to form activist 
groups and hold employers, or public 
institutions, to account (for example, 
through whistle-blowing). 
Erosion of civil liberties through 
automated censorship or manipulation 
could slowly emerge as the new normal. 
Monopolistic corporates could squeeze 
morality into their products, such as an 
in-home digital device such as Alexa that 
could ‘snitch’ to parents (or authorities) 
about adolescents’ drug use, for example. 
Digital code can force us to act a certain 
way and transgressions can be instantly 
logged and punished. Taken to the limit, 
increasing surveillance could become a 
societal panopticon where everyone is 
surveilled all the time, without the ability 
to watch the watchers. Imbalances in 
power such as this are easily entrenched 
and, without vigilance, human societies 
could sleepwalk into AI-facilitated 
totalitarianism.
Differential adoption of such 
technologies by powerful regimes and 
corporations could lead to profound 
disruptions in the world order, which New 
Zealand policymakers should be concerned 
about. This is particularly so given this 
country’s extreme dependence on the rest 
of the world for trade, tourism and the 
exchange of new ideas and technologies. 
The risk of violence and conflict 
Fully autonomous vehicles and drones 
raise the possibility of a wide range of 
near-future lethal autonomous weapon 
systems (LAWS). Russia has opened 
a ‘technopolis’ hub to pursue advanced 
military technologies, including AI 
(Bendett, 2019); the 2018 US Department 
of Defense strategy calls for AI to be pushed 
across the military (Department of Defense, 
2018); and China has a very ambitious AI 
development plan with a focus on civil–
military fusion (Johnson, 2019). 
Among the catastrophic risks from AI 
identified in one review is the ‘wrong 
command sent to a robot army’ (Turchin 
and Denkenberger, 2018a). But a wrong 
command is not necessary. A significant 
threat is not that lethal systems obey 
commands, but that they run amok. In 
2010 financial algorithms caused a flash 
crash of the US stock market, wiping 9% 
off the Dow Jones in 30 minutes (Bridle, 
2018). A ‘flash crash’ event involving 
autonomous weapons, such as a massive 
AI-coordinated swarm of drones or 
‘slaughter bots’, could be catastrophic. The 
European Parliament has called for a ban 
on LAWS (European Parliament, 2018), 
but at the September 2019 meeting on the 
Convention on Certain Conventional 
Weapons, Russia and the US continued to 
resist the requirement for ‘human control’ 
of weapon systems.
AI could also be harnessed for a digital 
attack by states or by terrorists. The World 
Economic Forum sees the threat of AI-
enabled cyber-attack as a major concern 
(World Economic Forum, 2019). Cyber-
attacks posing a catastrophic threat include 
ransomware attacks on cloud-computing 
providers, attacks on electricity suppliers, and 
attacks directed at weapons systems. New 
forms of terrorism could attempt to disrupt 
automated global markets by manipulating 
algorithmic processes (Bridle, 2018). 
New forms of attack do not just steal 
information, but aim to shut down public 
infrastructure, cause physical damage and 
erase data (Greenberg, 2019). The stakes 
are high when attacks have successfully 
penetrated nuclear power stations that are 
not connected to the internet. Often, 
witting or unwitting humans are used as 
attack vectors. A worrying risk would be 
cyber-attacks escalating to real-world 
attacks (Das, 2019). New Zealand will need 
to ensure that robust cyber security is a 
priority moving forward. 
The risk of AI in combination with other 
threats
As a general purpose technology, like the 
steam engine, electricity or the internet, 
AI has the potential to enhance other 
New forms of attack do not just steal 
information, but aim to shut down 
public infrastructure, cause physical 
damage and erase data.
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catastrophic risks. For example, AI is 
integral to many advances in genetic 
technologies and other biotechnologies. 
Building on AlphaFold, AI could be 
used in ways that increase the risk of a 
biotechnological catastrophe, such as 
an accidental or intentional extreme 
pandemic (from genetically-engineered 
biological agents), or catastrophic 
disruption to critical ecosystems or food 
supplies. One survey estimates a 2% 
probability of human extinction from 
engineered pandemics by the year 2100 
(Sandberg and Bostrom, 2008).
AI is also a concern for nuclear weapons 
and fissile materials safety. A 2019 report 
on the impact of AI on nuclear threats and 
strategic stability finds that AI could 
amplify risks (Boulanin, 2019). Key 
vulnerabilities include brittle nuclear 
systems, the threat of AI-driven cyber-
attack, and misperceptions about the 
activities and intent of rival states with 
respect to AI and nuclear capability. 
Quantum computing in conjunction 
with AI could plausibly pose new risks. 
Google has recently published a paper 
claiming that its quantum computers can 
outperform standard computers on a 
particular problem (Arute et al., 2019). 
Known as ‘quantum supremacy’, this new 
advance could be the first step towards 
vulnerabilities in encryption and other 
high-stakes systems. 
Bostrom has advanced a ‘vulnerable 
world hypothesis’, which contemplates 
technological discoveries that could 
threaten humanity (Bostrom, 2019). It is 
possible that five scientists tinkering in a 
lab for a year, with the aid of machine 
learning and a digital–biological converter 
(Boles et al., 2017), could accidentally or 
intentionally bring about Bostrom’s 
‘moderately easy bio doom’, thereby proving 
his vulnerable world hypothesis correct 
(Bostrom, 2019). Potential strategies have 
been advanced to mitigate some of these 
combination threats, and New Zealand 
policymakers should become familiar with 
them.
The risks of artificial general intelligence
Artificial general intelligence (AGI) that 
possesses human-level capability, or 
superintelligence that vastly outperforms 
humans in all tasks, are as yet only 
theoretical. However, if successfully 
developed, AGI would pose additional 
risks, in part because it could be used 
by one organisation or state to achieve 
an unassailable strategic advantage. 
But AGI could also be problematic if 
its goals are poorly specified or not 
aligned with those of human wellbeing. 
This is a serious risk in part because of 
the technical difficulties in designing 
risk-free systems (Amodei et al., 2016; 
Bostrom, 2014). Concerns about AGI 
are not particularly pressing now, but 
estimates for the arrival of human-level 
intelligence, which might then exhibit an 
explosion of very rapid self-improvement, 
sit at 50% by 2040 (Muller and Bostrom, 
2016). Policymakers therefore need to at 
least agree on a timetable for when we 
start to think about this issue, and what 
signals would trigger earlier action. 
Unknown risks
Rapid technological progress, and 
the associated interactions between 
technology, society and the environment, 
could lead to dynamic, difficult-to-
predict threats – ‘technological wildcards’ 
(Ó hÉigeartaigh, 2017). We know that the 
history of the world is partly driven by 
‘black swans’, rare and hard-to-predict 
events that change everything (Taleb, 
2007). Without further analysis we don’t 
know which risks from AI will become 
most salient, and we don’t know if AI is 
the most salient risk (it could well be) 
in the near term or at later stages of AI 
maturity. The large number of failure 
modes described above, and elsewhere, 
suggests that we haven’t yet contemplated 
all of them (Turchin and Denkeberger, 
2018a). In light of these unknowns, an 
agile, broad and adaptable policy response 
to the future of AI appears warranted.
Potential New Zealand policy response 
options
AI is a diverse technology touching every 
branch of government and society. We 
therefore reason that AI risk mitigation 
should be seen as one component of 
a general catastrophic risk mitigation 
strategy. The scale of global catastrophic 
risks, their uncertain probability, and 
the long time frame across which risks 
may emerge mean that individual 
governments and groups of like-minded 
ones contributing to global governance is 
really the only place from which to mount 
an effective response. 
The Cambridge Centre for the Study of 
Existential Risk (CSER) has published a list 
of policy options for governments to 
consider with regard to global catastrophic 
risks (CSER, 2019). This identifies five 
barriers to effectively dealing with 
catastrophic risks such as those posed by 
AI. These are: 
•	 lack	of	incentives	for	long-termism	in	
national policy;
•	 lack	of	government	agility	to	respond	
to new perspectives on risk; 
•	 insufficient	risk	management	culture	
in government;
•	 lack	of	technical	expertise;	and	
•	 failure	of	imagination.	
We believe that these problems all apply 
in New Zealand and see five key areas – 
described below – where New Zealand 
policy could help mitigate the catastrophic 
risks from AI. A key obstacle, as Tom 
Barraclough, co-author of the Perception 
Inception report, notes, is that ‘It’s not clear 
who is responsible in government for 
anticipating these issues’ (Kenny and 
Livingston, 2019). 
It is true that there are many imme-
diately pressing demands on the public 
sector, but there is enormous value in the 
Increased multilateralism may be a 
productive response to a range of threats 
and New Zealand diplomats should join 
and advance New Zealand and other 
initiatives.
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future which may be put at risk if we do 
not take time for big-picture thinking 
(Boyd and Wilson, 2018). For this reason, 
an imperative first step is to designate 
responsibility for investigating and 
advocating on these issues. Some 
mechanism for distilling the information 
and advising various key decision makers 
is necessary to ensure comprehensive 
coverage and avoid redundant analysis (or 
omission). Furthermore, risks need to be 
evaluated as a portfolio so that prioritisation 
can occur. We should focus on the most 
important, not the merely important, risks. 
Advocate for international cooperation
It is clear that the threats described 
above could have global impact and that 
a global response is needed. There have 
been some steps in this direction. In July 
2018 the United Nations secretary general 
appointed a High-level Panel on Digital 
Cooperation to support ‘cooperative and 
interdisciplinary approaches to ensure a 
safe inclusive digital future for all taking 
into account relevant human rights norms’ 
(Walsh et al., 2019). With respect to AI, 
the Canadian and French governments 
have instigated an International Panel 
on Artificial Intelligence. This body is 
modelled on the Intergovernmental Panel 
on Climate Change and aims to bring 
together policy experts and researchers 
in AI, the humanities and social 
sciences to ensure that AI development 
is grounded in human rights (Marrs, 
2019). At meetings associated with 
the G7 summit in 2019, New Zealand 
expressed interest in joining this panel, 
and this would seem highly desirable. 
There also exists an International Grand 
Committee on Disinformation and 
‘Fake News’: representatives from 12 
nations, including Australia, Finland 
and the United Kingdom, met in Ireland 
in November 2019 (Houses of the 
Oireachtas Communications Unit, 2019). 
Increased multilateralism may be a 
productive response to a range of threats 
and New Zealand diplomats should join 
and advance New Zealand and other 
initiatives. 
In a number of precedents New Zealand 
has taken a key role in global coordination 
around threat, such as the anti-nuclear 
stance. The country’s recent lead role in 
the Christchurch Call shows that the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade is 
well placed to progress such initiatives. 
There are currently insufficient 
coordinating and monitoring mechanisms 
to prevent an AI catastrophe should it arise. 
A general ability to stabilise a world 
vulnerable to technological risk might 
require greater capacities for preventive 
policing and global governance (Bostrom, 
2019). Ironically, some degree of intrusive 
surveillance (for example, in certain risk 
domains around AI such as military 
applications and biotechnology) might be 
required to effectively monitor risks and 
eliminate serious threats. As well as 
advocating for international cooperation, 
New Zealand could take action beyond the 
Christchurch Call and set a standard for 
other nations to follow. 
The need to structure and resource public 
institutions so that solutions are possible
Any diplomatic response by New Zealand 
must be well informed. It is important to 
be clear who is responsible for this advice 
and to ensure they are well resourced, or 
quality advice will not be forthcoming. 
Given the specialist nature of (and rapidly 
growing international literature on) AI 
policy and safety, a dedicated unit is 
required to evaluate risks and possible 
responses. This necessarily ongoing 
process (for AI and other technologies) 
should be institutionalised through the 
creation of enabling structures in the New 
Zealand public sector. ‘Small government’ 
thinking is inappropriate when a nation 
faces major threats and needs to support 
getting global governance working.
Whatever form this specialist unit takes, 
it could logically reside in the Department 
of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, or the 
Ministry for Foreign Affairs and Trade, or 
even the Ministry of Business, Innovation 
and Employment. The unit will need some 
level of independence, and a broad 
mandate for long-term thinking across a 
range of AI risks (and opportunities). This 
would allow the catastrophic risks from AI 
to be studied and managed with input 
from NGOs and academic institutions not 
constrained by legacy and near-horizon 
political thinking. 
Given the rapidly advancing risks in the 
field, this unit must be formed now, and 
be flexible and agile. Its success will depend 
on the quality of thinking it harbours. This 
means that a competent multidisciplinary 
team must be involved, including 
exceptional AI technical experts and 
engineers, experts from other dual-use 
technology disciplines, such as 
biotechnology, and historians, social 
scientists and ethicists with knowledge of 
social and political transformations 
underpinned by technology. The personnel 
recruited will be key to determining the 
success of this task. 
The future value of free and flourishing 
New Zealand lives justifies at least a modest 
investment in protection (Boyd and Wilson, 
2018), and even more so if New Zealand is 
particularly well placed as an island nation 
to survive some existential threats (Boyd 
and Wilson, 2019). In the context of 
catastrophic risks, it seems reasonable to 
apportion perhaps 0.01% of GDP 
(approximately $25 million in the first 
year) to analysing the threats of AI and 
other potential catastrophic risks to New 
Zealand. This kind of approach provides 
something of an insurance policy against 
future risks. After the initial scoping, future 
investment needs, and options, will be 
clearer. 
Given the specialist nature of and 
rapidly growing international literature 
on AI policy and safety, a dedicated unit 
is required to evaluate risks and possible 
responses. 
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Understand the risks and take a risk 
management approach
A number of global research institutes 
have examined the risks posed by AI: these 
include the Future of Humanity Institute, 
the Machine Intelligence Research 
Institute, Open AI and CSER, among 
others. However, research publications are 
not effective unless used to inform policy. 
The initial investment outlined above 
must ensure that the outputs of these 
global institutions are digested to inform 
local policy; the investment could also 
fund secondments of government staff 
(and from New Zealand-based NGOs and 
universities) to centres such as the Future 
of Humanity Institute, Open AI and CSER 
in order to bolster local capability to think 
productively in this space. 
When managing risks, the priority of 
action depends on the likelihood that the 
risk will transpire, the magnitude of the 
resulting harm, and the ability to mitigate 
the risk. Even if the probability is low, if 
the potential harm is very great, and a 
solution possible, then some resources 
should rationally be allocated (even if this 
is a collective action problem requiring 
coordination of multiple countries). Initial 
work could focus on deducing the 
probabilities and magnitudes of the risks 
we have outlined. Monitoring needs to 
occur so that these values can be updated 
regularly over time. A scenario-based 
approach along with signal monitoring 
could determine which scenarios are 
eventuating. Table-top simulation exercises 
would help identify legislative and policy 
gaps requiring closer examination.
Implement mitigation strategies
Government inaction and the hope that 
the ‘ethics policies’ of the developers 
of technology will mitigate risk is not 
sufficient (Nemitz, 2018). Humans may 
now have the power to rapidly destabilise 
and destroy institutions and assets that we 
have built incrementally over centuries. 
Sustaining life and civilisation are 
inherently valuable projects and therefore 
essential. When any issue is ‘essential’, the 
principle of essentialism dictates that this 
issue must be dealt with by law (ibid.). We 
already have a set of agreed law that must 
be adhered to globally: the International 
Declaration of Human Rights, and other 
associated principles. Preserving human 
rights should be the benchmark for all risk 
mitigation pertaining to AI.
Beyond ensuring that human rights 
obligations are met, mitigation strategies 
should ensure that we can benefit from AI 
without suffering the harms. Strategies 
might include regulating certain 
technologies, certifying developers, 
banning some practices (such as 
impersonating humans), monitoring 
developments in AI, performing safety 
research, and other activities specific to 
particular threats. AI itself might form part 
of the solution to some of the risks posed 
by AI. This could be the case for the risk of 
cyber-attack, or the dissemination of 
dangerous information. 
Overall, a focus on risk and reliability 
is important. ‘Concrete problems in AI 
safety’ are already known (Amodei et al., 
2016) and guidelines for responsible AI 
systems are being produced, such as the 
Alan Turing Institute’s ‘responsible design 
of AI systems in the public sector’ (Leslie, 
2019). The aim should be to accelerate this 
safety research. 
Consider the longer term
Although there is a need to move quickly 
to address AI risks, we note that AI risks 
are situated within a suite of emerging 
global catastrophic risks and there is 
also need for this work to feed into 
an aggregating mechanism that can 
prioritise risk response across a range 
of threats. We therefore argue that the 
New Zealand government should invest 
in futures analysis and horizon scanning, 
to increase its capability for foresight and 
shed light on the possible consequences 
of the choices humans make today. We 
agree with sociologist Elise Boulding 
that modern society is suffering from 
‘temporal exhaustion’: because we are 
‘mentally out of breath all the time 
from dealing with the present, there is 
no energy left for imagining the future’ 
(Boulding, 1978). Government has a deep 
responsibility to future generations and 
for long-term incentives that transcend 
individual interests. Even if some risks are 
far distant, our experience with climate 
change is telling. It takes a long time 
to mount a coordinated national and 
international response. It is helpful to 
remember that the Kyoto Protocol was 
signed in 1997, yet the threat posed by 
climate change is still very far from being 
solved.
This call for futures thinking has come 
from a number of quarters. NZ Tech has 
called for a ‘Ministry for the Future’ 
(Muller, Carter and Matthews, 2017). The 
Environmental Defence Society suggests 
a Futures Commission (Environmental 
Defence Society, 2019). Boston, Bagnall 
and Barry have argued at length for 
improved foresight and oversight to make 
government more accountable to 
Parliament for the quality of its long-term 
decision making. While noting that there 
is no obvious single best approach, these 
authors list a number of specific options 
for reform (Boston, Bagnall and Barry, 
2019). Some futures ideas are not new in 
New Zealand or overseas. Indeed, the 
Muldoon government disestablished a 
Commission for the Future in the early 
1980s. Sweden created a Ministry for the 
Future in 2014 (Ma-Dupont, 2016). 
AI is a heterogeneous package of 
technologies that pose risks unequal in 
probability and scale, and which do not 
stand alone. But we also need to place AI 
in a coordinated portfolio of interdependent 
global catastrophic risks. Institutionalised 
systematic assessment and response to all 
major catastrophic risks will be needed in 
New Zealand to ensure a thriving future. 
Government has a deep responsibility 
to future generations and for long-term 
incentives that transcend individual 
interests. 
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Conclusion
New Zealand has a number of important 
assets, including people, culture and the 
environment, to protect over the very 
longest time horizons. This is particularly 
true when one takes a perspective of 
guardianship consistent with a te ao 
Mäori world view. Such a perspective 
mandates that we understand the 
possible catastrophic risks of AI, which 
include threats to democracy, the risk of 
totalitarianism, threats to physical and 
digital safety, and as yet unknown risks. 
These risks need to be evaluated within 
the set of related global catastrophic risks. 
One way to achieve this is to advocate for 
a coordinated international response and 
to designate responsibility for evaluating 
the risks from AI and planning for their 
mitigation within the New Zealand public 
sector. Mitigation of catastrophic risks 
should be a critical component of public 
policy, and is an undertaking that only 
governments are positioned to perform, 
in conjunction with other like-minded 
governments. 
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